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How to Trade Fairly in an Unjust Society: The Problem of Gender Discrimination 
in the Labor Market 
 
Sarah C. Goff  
 
Abstract: Social scientists disagree about the causes of the “wage gap” between male 
and female workers and, in particular, how much of the gap is due to differences in 
workers’ productivity. Understanding the underlying causes is important, insofar as this 
helps identify who is responsible for closing the gap. This information is particularly 
relevant for specifying the responsibilities of employers, who have dual social roles as 
economic actors and as citizens. In this paper, I begin with the assumption that many 
employers underestimate the qualifications of female job applicants in hiring and 
promotion decisions. The paper then describes a form of discrimination that occurs when 
many economic actors make this kind of correlated error in their judgments. The paper 
argues that an individual employer has responsibilities not to make these errors in 
judgment about female workers, due to the harmful impact on women’s opportunities. An 
employer also has duties not to exploit female employees, which occurs when he pays 
them lower wages than he would if other employers did not discriminate against them. 
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The difference between the mean earnings of female workers and male workers is 
known as the “wage gap,” and it is often taken as evidence that women receive “unequal 
pay for equal work.” A direct comparison of men and women’s wages can be misleading, 
however, due to the fact that male and female workers tend to hold different kinds of 
jobs. Male and female workers tend to be segregated according to occupational 
categories, organizations, and their roles within organizations.
1
 Social scientists disagree 
about the reasons why female workers tend to be concentrated in the lower-paying 
segments of the labor market.
2
 Some argue that employers allocate positions primarily on 
the basis of workers’ productivity, while others argue that workers’ productivity does not 
provide a full explanation for employers’ decisions.  
On the first view, female workers on average have less relevant education, 
experience, and other aspects of “human capital.”3 Some proponents of this view argue 
that women tend to prefer occupations that permit workers to take intermittent leave, so 
that women can raise children without suffering setbacks to their earnings and career 
trajectories. For this reason, women tend to educate and train themselves to specialize in 
                                                        
1
 When sociologists and labor economists adjust for these and other differences between 
male and female workers, they can reduce the estimated wage gap to a smaller “residual.” 
For an overview of these estimates, see Doris Weichselbaumer and Rudolf Winter-
Ebmer, “A Meta-Analysis of the International Gender Wage Gap,” Journal of Economic 
Surveys 19 (2005): 479-511.  
2
 On patterns of segregation in the labor market, see William T Bielby and James N 
Baron, “Sex Segregation Within Occupations,” The American Economic Review 76 
(1986): 43-47, and Trond Petersen and Laurie Morgan, “Separate and Unequal: 
Occupation-Establishment Sex Segregation and the Gender Wage Gap,” American 
Journal of Sociology 101 (1995): 329–365. 
3
 See, for instance, Victor R. Fuchs, “Women's Quest for Economic Equality,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 3 (1989): 25–41.  
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these occupations, and employers allocate positions accordingly.
4
 A second group of 
scholars argue that the patterns of segregation suggest stereotyping and employers’ 
enforcement of workplace social norms.
5
 In support of this second view, some scholars 
cite “audit” studies, in which identical curriculum vitae with male and female names are 
given to employers, and employers have been shown to respond more favorably to the 
CVs with male names.
6
 In short, some researchers attribute the wage gap entirely to 
social inequalities outside the labor market, whilst others attribute it partially to decision-
making within the labor market. 
 This disagreement about the causes of the wage gap is normatively significant, 
insofar as it affects the division of social responsibilities for closing the wage gap. In 
particular, it is important for specifying the responsibilities of employers, who have dual 
social roles as economic actors and as citizens. As an economic actor, an employer enjoys 
a restricted domain of social permission to pursue his interests through exchanges and 
joint enterprises with other economic actors. In his role as a citizen, the same individual 
has broader responsibilities that may also have implications for his decisions as an 
employer. This paper will distinguish between employers’ responsibilities for the wage 
                                                        
4
 Solomon William Polachek writes, “Put simply, it is not occupation per se that causes 
lower wages, but sex differences in lifetime human capital investment brought about 
primarily by the division of labor within the home.” “Occupational Segregation and the 
Gender Wage Gap,” Population Research and Policy Review 6 (1987): 47–67, 63.  
5
 William Bielby and James Baron, “Men and Women at Work: Sex Segregation and 
Statistical Discrimination,” American Journal of Sociology 91 (1986): 759–799. Their 
argument that male and female workers have similar skills is meant to show that 
employers are not engaging in a rational form of “statistical discrimination,” in which 
gender is employed as a useful proxy for unobserved productivity.  
6
 David Neumark et al., “Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996): 915–41. See also Claudia Goldin and 
Cecilia Rouse, “Orchestrating Impartiality: the Effect of Blind Auditions on Female 
Musicians” The American Economic Review 90 (2000): 715–741. 
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gap in both of these roles. If social inequalities outside the labor market are the primary 
cause of the wage gap, an individual has responsibilities to address these inequalities as a 
citizen, but not specifically as an employer.
7
 However, if decision-making within the 
labor market is a significant cause of the wage gap, then employers have responsibilities 
specifically in their roles as economic actors.  
In this paper, I assume that some employers discriminate against female workers, 
and that this discrimination explains a significant portion of the wage gap.
8
 I specifically 
assume that employers discriminate against female workers in the sense that they make 
correlated errors in their judgment of women’s qualifications, which restricts women’s 
access to opportunities. This restriction, in turn, is argued to reduce women’s bargaining 
power with their own employers and to enable employers to exploit their female workers, 
through reduced wages in exchange for their work. This paper describes these labor 
market dynamics, and illustrates them with a case originally described in Alan 
Greenspan’s memoirs. In his memoirs, Greenspan explains how he was able to hire 
female employees for his firm at a relatively low cost, due to his competitors’ biases 
against female job candidates.  
                                                        
7
 Many political theorists believe that society ought not to impose economic penalties on 
women’s choices to train for and seek out occupations that are compatible with their 
caregiving responsibilities. Anne Phillips has argued that women’s “choice” of low-
paying and low-status occupations should be taken as prima facie evidence of women’s 
accommodation to unequal circumstances, “Defending Equality of Outcome” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 12 (2004): 1-19, pp. 12. Ann Cudd has argued that women’s greater 
caretaking burdens, and their shorter tenure in paid employment, are a joint byproduct of 
women’s unequal treatment within the family and the labor market, “Oppression by 
Choice,” Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (1994): 22–44. 
8
 In particular, I find that the audit studies provide convincing evidence in support of the 
paper’s assumption (see footnote 6).  
 5 
The paper aims to describe two particular wrongs that employers can be engaged 
in when hiring and promoting employees in a gender-segregated labor market, and their 
corresponding duties to avoid committing these wrongs. The paper proceeds as follows. 
Part 1 provides an account of discrimination that is suitable for assessment of economic 
decision-making: economic actors discriminate when they make correlated errors in their 
judgments, which causes harms in expectation. Part 2 explains how the practice of 
discrimination among some employers can have an unfavorable impact on prices for 
women’s labor. Part 3 details my conception of exploitative trade, and argues that market 
actors have duties to refrain from engaging in trade on exploitative terms. Part 4 
describes what Alan Greenspan should have done in the 1970s, when the wage gap was 
larger than today and the effects of discrimination were more easily observable,
9
 and 
what contemporary employers and citizens should do.  
 
Part 1: Discrimination as Correlated Errors in Judgments 
This section will provide an account explaining how an employer discriminates 
when he allocates a job, or an opportunity for promotion, to a man instead of a woman 
who would perform better in the position. This account of discrimination is not intended 
to be comprehensive. The employer’s action can be discriminatory in a different 
descriptive sense, and it can be morally wrong for different reasons, than I will describe 
here. For instance, the employer’s selection of a male worker over a more qualified 
female worker may be discriminatory in the sense that it is degrading to women,
10
 or 
                                                        
9
 Francine D. Blau et al., “Continuing Progress? Trends in Occupational Segregation in 
the United States Over the 1970s and 1980s,” Feminist Economics 4 (1998): 29–71. 
10
 Deborah Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong? (Harvard University Press, 2011) 
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because it reflects the employer’s prejudices about the moral worth of female workers.11 
However, the employer’s decision need not be degrading to women, or prejudicial about 
the moral worth of female workers, in order for the decision to be discriminatory on the 
account I will describe.  
 My account of discrimination is a “harm” based account.12 The “harm” occurs 
when a person (or persons) experiences a worse outcome, by comparison to the outcome 
that the person (or persons) can be expected to have experienced if discrimination had not 
taken place. It is essential to set a baseline standard of non-discriminatory behavior, in 
order to identity when a person’s actions cause harm. As indicated in the paper’s 
introduction, the empirical scholarship on discrimination in labor markets assumes that 
non-discriminatory employers will hire on the basis of workers’ expected productivity. 
On a strict view of this baseline, employers discriminate against prospective hires 
whenever they allocate positions to less productive workers.
13
  
  To illustrate this, consider if employers routinely fail to detect slight differences 
in productivity among the top candidates for a position. Due to this routine failure of 
judgment, employers often allocate the position at random to one of the top candidates, 
whilst believing that they have selected the very best. From the perspective of the first-
                                                        
11
 Larry Alexander, “What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 141 (1992): 149–219. 
12
 On harm-based accounts of discrimination, as alternatives to “mental state” accounts 
and “objective meaning” accounts, see Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and 
Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination (Oxford University 
Press, 2013) pp. 153-192. His own harm-based account is desert-accommodating 
prioritarianism, and welfarist. By contrast, I will endorse an equality of opportunity 
account in which the value of an opportunity is not reducible to its effects on welfare.  
13
 It is possible to understand this as a “meritocratic” selection principle. David Miller 
argues that meritocracy is compatible with a central role for market-based decision-
making in “Two Cheers for Meritocracy,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996): 
277–301. 
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best candidate who has not been offered a particular position, it may appear that this 
decision-making procedure has harmed her. She does not receive the job for which she is 
the very best candidate, and thus the employer’s misjudgment of her qualifications has 
made her worse off. According to the baseline of optimally rational decision-making, an 
employer causes harm to this candidate by making an ordinary, random mistake. While 
one purpose of describing a harm is to register when a person has taken an action that 
makes another person worse off, another important purpose is to make a claim that the 
causing agent has deviated from a reasonable standard of behavior. I reject the standard 
of optimally rational decision-making, because it fails to fulfill the second purpose of 
describing the harm of discrimination.  
I will propose a revised version of the principle that provides a more plausible 
baseline standard for employers’ behavior, which permits routine, independent 
misjudgments of the kind I have described in my example above. The reason to be 
permissive about decision-procedures that include routine, independent misjudgments is 
that they are not expected to cause worse outcomes for any candidate. In the example 
above, one employer’s mistake happened to fall to the job seeker’s disadvantage when 
she was the first-best candidate. However, the mistakes of other employers could be 
advantageous for her. The next employer may make a mistaken judgment that the job 
seeker is the first-best candidate, when in fact she is merely the second-best for that 
position. If, as I have stipulated for my example, employers routinely make independent 
random selections among the top candidates, then it is equally likely that the job 
candidate will experience favor and disfavor from any particular employer. The overall 
 8 
effects of employers’ independent errors will be neutral for that candidate in expectation, 
as she continues to seek out employment. 
 The candidate can expect to experience a worse outcome if the employer’s errors 
in judgment about her are non-independent, that is to say, correlated with the errors in 
judgment of other employers. To illustrate the difference between independent and 
correlated errors, consider an employer who uses her private gut feelings as a proxy for 
judgment about the trustworthiness of job candidates (these feelings depend on what the 
employer ate for breakfast). Her gut feelings lead her to make a false judgment of a 
particular job candidate, and for this reason she does not hire him. The employer’s error 
in judgment is unique to herself, since no other employers share her gut feelings or take 
their cues from her. Her error in judgment is independent of errors in judgment that other 
employers might make.  
Now we can consider a different explanation for why the employer misjudges the 
candidate. The employer distrusts the candidate because a false rumor is circulating about 
the applicant’s honesty. Due to the rumor, many employers will make the same error in 
judgment about the applicant’s suitability for employment.14 When employers determine 
that the candidate is unsuitable on the basis of this false rumor, they are making 
correlated errors in judgment. Their decision-making procedure can be expected to cause 
a worse outcome for the candidate. While it is true that the employer who follows her gut 
feelings has actually caused the candidate to be denied a job, her decision-making 
                                                        
14
 We could imagine that there are two false rumors circulating about the candidate, one 
concerning his honesty and the other concerning his work ethic. Thus, employers can 
have different mistaken reasons for forming their judgments about the candidate’s 
unsuitability. What matters on my view is that there is a correlation in their mistaken 
judgments, and not that the employers all have precisely the same reasons for making 
their mistakes.   
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procedure is not expected to cause the candidate to suffer a worse outcome. It is 
admittedly possible, although unlikely, that many employers who decide to follow their 
own idiosyncratic gut feelings could form the same false judgments about the suitability 
of an amply qualified job candidate. However, this would occur purely due to chance. 
There would be no reason to expect this run of bad luck to continue as the candidate 
continues to seek a job.  
It is appropriate to evaluate how employers’ routine practices of decision-making 
will affect a job candidate in expectation, when there are many employers allocating 
similar kinds of jobs and opportunities for advancement. Sometimes employers make 
decisions about how to allocate unique positions and opportunities, and these decisions 
are beyond the scope of my theory of discrimination. Workers may feel that their current 
positions of employment cannot be substituted for positions elsewhere, particularly when 
they have formed personal relationships and attachments at their place of work. When 
workers correctly (or even possibly incorrectly) believe their current positions are unique, 
employers may have duties of fair and non-discriminatory treatment in the allocation of 
opportunities for workers’ advancement. I do not take a position on these duties here, 
except to say that they are different from the duties of non-discrimination defended in the 
paper and they may be more demanding.  
I have stated my assumption in the paper’s introduction that employers 
discriminate against female workers and this has significant negative effects on them. At 
this point in the argument, I can provide a definition that describes what employers are 
doing when they discriminate against female workers. I propose this baseline standard for 
individual economic decision-makers’ behavior: an economic decision-maker acts 
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rationally in pursuit of his interests and, in so doing, he is entitled to make errors, subject 
to the constraint that his errors are not correlated with the errors of other decision-
makers.
15
 When an employer makes an error in judgment about the qualifications of 
female workers, and therefore fails to pursue his own interests in hiring or promoting 
women, the employer’s decision-making is discriminatory.16 It is discriminatory because 
other employers are making this same error in their judgment of female workers, thereby 
causing harms to the female workers in expectation. 
These discriminatory harms are wrongful in virtue of the fact that they undermine 
women’s equality of opportunity.17 I assume that women are entitled to equality of 
opportunity and to receive fair terms of compensation from their employers, an 
assumption shared by many critics of the “wage gap.” The paper will argue that the 
primary role of employers in fulfilling these entitlements is not to discriminate against 
female job candidates and, as will be argued in the next sections, not to exploit their 
female workers. If employers discriminate against female job candidates, and exploit 
their female workers, then it will be very difficult (if not impossible) for a society to 
                                                        
15
 There is a difference between the employer’s interests as an individual within an 
organization and the interests of his firm as a whole. For the purposes of this paper, I am 
assuming the employer rationally pursues his firm’s interests.  
16
 Implicit bias is pervasive, and it may explain how employers can make these mistakes 
in judgment without having any consciously prejudicial attitudes towards women. On 
implicit bias in philosophy, see Jennifer Saul, “Ranking Exercises in Philosophy and 
Implicit Bias,” Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (2012): 256–73. 
17
  I follow Shlomi Segall in viewing discrimination as bad because it undermines 
equality of opportunity, “What's So Bad About Discrimination?” Utilitas 24 (2012): 82–
100. However, there are several important differences between our views. Segall seeks to 
provide a comprehensive explanation of the badness of discrimination, whereas this paper 
merely describes one form of discrimination. I view the experience of discrimination as a 
“harm” suffered by a person who therefore enjoys less than equal opportunities, whereas 
Segall argues that discrimination is a “disadvantage.” Finally, Segall describes the value 
of an opportunity in terms of a person’s welfare, whilst I value opportunities as such.  
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achieve equality of opportunity and to close the wage gap. In non-ideal cases where 
equality of opportunity does not presently exist, employers’ discrimination and 
exploitation of women will worsen inequalities in many (but not all) cases.
18
 
My argument is that employers have primary responsibilities as economic actors 
not to cause wrongful discriminatory harms, and not to exploit female workers who 
experience wrongful discrimination (or other kinds of harmful wrongs). These are 
distinguished from the more general responsibilities employers may have as citizens to 
help remedy social inequalities, including inequalities they have neither caused nor 
unfairly benefited from. Consider again the argument that sources of the wage gap are 
primarily outside the economic sphere, as well as the argument that discriminatory 
decision-making is an important source. Many political theorists argue that women enjoy 
unequal opportunities because they are socialized to be less ambitious, and often have 
greater caretaking burdens. If it is true that female workers are less productive for these 
reasons, employers may have duties as citizens to extend additional opportunities to 
women to seek to redress these broader social inequalities.
19
 By contrast, this paper has 
assumed that a major source of inequality is that employers make erroneous judgments 
about women’s productivity. If employers do not hire women when it is in their interest 
to do so, then employers have failed to fulfill responsibilities that are specific to their 
social role as economic actors.  
                                                        
18
 Some women may enjoy greater than equal opportunities as a result of practices of 
discrimination that are perpetuated against other disadvantaged groups. Under these non-
ideal conditions, it is not necessarily true that all cases of employer discrimination against 
women are wrongful harms.  
19
 I do not affirm here that there are indeed these duties of citizenship, but merely that this 
is the best way to characterize the argument in favor of employers taking these actions.  
 12 
Economic actors enjoy limited social entitlements to engage in rational pursuit of 
their interests. The underlying justification of this social role is that economic actors will 
help secure benefits for society as a whole, including equality of opportunity for all 
citizens (so this paper has assumed). Engaging in non-discriminatory decision-making, 
according to the standard described above, is properly understood as a responsibility of 
economic actors. Indeed, employers may find it demanding to fulfill the responsibilities I 
have specified for their roles as economic actors. This paper will defend the view that 
economic actors, including employers, have significant responsibilities, due to the non-
ideal circumstances in which they find themselves.  
Non-ideal theorizing often makes significant epistemic demands, precisely 
because it requires actors to take account of the factual details of their non-ideal 
circumstances.
20
 I will briefly sketch the informational demands on employers in order to 
avoid engaging in discrimination against female workers.
21
 An economic actor needs to 
engage in self-reflection and gain insight into his/her own decision making-processes, to 
determine whether they tend to produce erroneous judgments. Then, the economic actor 
requires knowledge about other actors’ decision-making processes, in order to determine 
whether his/her own erroneous judgments are correlated. In addition, economic actors 
will need to judge whether the harmful effects of their discriminatory practices are also 
morally wrong. On a harm-based account of discrimination, the wrongfulness of 
discrimination is contingent upon its effects. Discriminatory practices are often 
                                                        
20
 Lisa Herzog, “Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory and the Problem of Knowledge,” Journal of 
Applied Philosophy 29 (2012): 271–288.  
21
 For an important analysis and set of practical suggestions for employers, see Geert 
Demuijnck, “Non-Discrimination in Human Resources Management as a Moral 
Obligation,” Journal of Business Ethics 88 (2009): 83–101.  
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overlapping and intersecting, which can produce non-obvious patterns of advantage and 
disadvantage in non-ideal societies.
22
 It may not be wrong for employers to inflict 
discriminatory harms upon a group that is socially advantaged, particularly in favor of 
other groups who are otherwise socially disadvantaged.  
I do not mean to suggest that economic actors have responsibilities to act on the 
basis of information they could not possibly obtain. Rather, I think it is fitting that 
economic actors should bear some responsibility for collecting and analyzing information 
about their own judgments, the patterns of their competitors’ judgments, and the overall 
effects of discriminatory decision-making on workers’ opportunities. This kind of 
information is not merely useful for morally responsible decision-making. It is also useful 
for economic actors to better pursue their own interests, and thereby promote the broader 
social goods that justify economic actors’ entitlements.  
The next part of the paper will explain how gender-based discrimination in the 
labor market can have additional undesirable consequences for women, through its 
unfavorable impact on prices for women’s labor. In a case described in Alan Greenspan’s 
memoirs, an employer observes a pattern of qualified female workers’ exclusion from 
economic opportunities. This section will describe this case in detail, and the following 
section will argue that even non-discriminatory employers have good moral reasons to 
take note of gender-based discrimination in the labor market.  
 
Part 2: The Effects of Discrimination on Market Rates for Women’s Work 
                                                        
22
 Kimberlé Crenshaw, “A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and 
Politics,” in The Politics of Law (Pantheon Books, NY: 1990), pp. 195-218.  
 14 
In his memoirs, Alan Greenspan describes his hiring policy for the economics 
firm he owned and managed in the 1970s. Greenspan explains his policy of hiring 
women, and how it benefited his firm:  
“Townsend-Greenspan was unusual for an economics firm in that the men worked for the 
women (we had about twenty-five employees in all). My hiring of women economists 
was not motivated by women’s liberation. It just made great business sense. I valued men 
and women equally, and found that because other employers did not, good women 
economists were less expensive than men. Hiring women did two things: it gave 
Townsend-Greenspan higher-quality work for the same money, and it marginally raised 
the market value of women.”23   
In the 1970s U.S., gender segregation within the labor market was more prevalent and 
readily observable than today.
24
 The excerpt from Alan Greenspan’s memoirs helps to 
illustrate labor market dynamics that, as this paper assumes, are still present today in 
diminished form. This section will explain how employers’ discriminatory practices 
reduced the efficiency of the labor market, directly reduced women’s opportunities, and 
indirectly reduced their rates of compensation.  
We can infer much about employers’ decision-making processes from 
Greenspan’s observation that “good women economists were less expensive than men.” 
The observation indicates that many employers were not optimizing their firms’ interests, 
specifically, their interests in paying less for the work of “good economists.” To optimize 
the firm’s interest, an employer should hire female economists until the point at which 
                                                        
23
 Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (Penguin  
Press, 2008), pg. 74.  
24
 Francine D. Blau et al., “Continuing Progress? Trends in Occupational Segregation in 
the United States Over the 1970s and 1980s.”  
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good female economists cost as much as males.
25
 Nevertheless, many employers 
continued to hire male economists at their firms’ greater expense. Either the employers 
were making similar errors in their efforts to hire good economists for lesser expense, or 
they were not actually trying to optimize their firms’ interests. I will continue to presume 
that employers are seeking to optimize their firm’s interests.  
Greenspan’s observations do not illuminate why employers make errors in 
judgment about women’s qualifications. Greenspan’s view is that employers did not 
“value” men and women equally. By this, Greenspan could mean that employers had 
biased beliefs about the economic value of female employees, or that employers failed to 
assign women’s interests the same moral value as men’s. Without the benefit of 
psychological insight, it is impossible to establish that employers acted on the basis of 
unconscious bias or deliberate misogyny. On my view, it is only necessary to identify the 
underlying reason for these errors if we are seeking to assess the employers’ 
blameworthiness. Either ill-will towards women or implicit bias could be the explanation 
for employers made the same errors in judgment about women, and of course the former 
is much more blameworthy than the latter. On my account, however, what is essential is 
that many employers make these correlated errors and thereby produce harms. Employers 
discriminate against women because they make non-independent errors in judgment that 
have harmful effects, undermining women’s equality of opportunity for employment. As 
                                                        
25
 It is rational to hire women because a good female economist is no less productive for 
her firm in virtue of being female, and she costs less than a male economist. This 
presumes that other firms face the same conditions as Greenspan’s, in which female 
employers are not hindered in their productivity through customers’ or colleagues’ 
negative “reactions” to women.  
 16 
I will now argue, discrimination also can be problematic due to its knock-on effects on 
women’s rates of compensation for their work.  
The female economist’s experience of discrimination is a constraint that impedes 
her in her economic interactions. This constraint has a negative effect on her bargaining 
power with her employer, Alan Greenspan. Since discrimination restricts her 
opportunities to work within her profession, she becomes more willing to accept 
Greenspan’s terms of employment. In the figure below, I depict the price of women’s 
labor and compare it to the price under counter-factual conditions. There is necessarily 
some indeterminacy in the specification of counter-factual market prices, since we cannot 
fully predict how actors will react in accordance with their changed circumstances. While 
it is not possible to predict the precise terms of negotiated agreements, it is possible to 
model the range of agreements that it would be rational for economic actors to accept 
under these altered conditions. It is expected that a person with restricted opportunities 
has less negotiating power, and thus will rationally accept lower wages from an employer 
who offers an opportunity. I represent competitive market prices for women’s labor, in 
the figure below, by depicting a range of possible prices.  
1) In the actual 1970s U.S. labor market, the minimum wage that would have 
made the female economists better off is equal to w1, where w1 is the opportunity cost of 
an employee’s time (which includes foregone alternative employment options). 
2) In the actual 1970s U.S. labor market, the maximum wage that would have 
made Townsend-Greenspan better off is equal to w2, where w2 is the marginal value to 
the firm provided by the female economist. 
 17 
3) In a counter-factual 1970s U.S. society without gender discrimination, the 
minimum wage that would have made the female economists better off is equal to w3, 
where w3 is the opportunity cost of an employee’s time. W1 is less than w3, because 
female economists have fewer alternative options in a society with gender discrimination. 
For this reason, they are willing to accept a lower wage from Townsend-Greenspan. 
4) In a counter-factual 1970s U.S. society without gender discrimination, the 
maximum wage that would have made Townsend-Greenspan better off is equal to w4, 
where w4 is the marginal value to the firm provided by the female economist. I will 
assume that w4 is the same as w2, although this might not be the case if eliminating 
gender discrimination had large-scale effects on the broader economy. 
 












The female economist would not accept any wage between w1 and w3, if the pool 
of potential employers had non-discriminatory hiring policies. Wages between w1 and 
w3 would not adequately compensate for foregoing the opportunities at competing firms. 
In the actual society in which they lived, Greenspan and a female economist would have 
found it in their mutual interest to agree on a wage anywhere in the range w1-w2. In the 
counter-factual version of their society, they would have found it in their mutual interest 
 19 
to agree on a wage anywhere in the narrower range of w3-w4. The range w1-w3 is in 
their bargaining range in the actual society, but not in the counter-factual society. We can 
see that this range, w1-w3 includes prices for the female economist’s labor that are more 
favorable to Greenspan than any in the range w3-w4. Greenspan enjoyed relatively 
favorable terms of trade if the price of the female economist’s labor was in the range w1-
w3, which I call the range of “Less Favorable Wages.”  
This argument explains Greenspan’s decision to make a low wage offer to female 
economists but not to males. It also explains the female economist’s decision to accept 
Greenspan’s offer, which otherwise would be quite puzzling. Why would she accept 
employment with Townsend-Greenspan, knowing that competing firms pay higher wages 
to her male peers? Female economists faced exactly this scenario, and some still accepted 
offers to work for Townsend-Greenspan. It seems implausible that these women accepted 
Greenspan’s offer due to ignorance about the superior opportunities at competing firms 
(after all, they were excellent economists). More plausibly, it was a fully informed and 
rational decision for a female economist to accept Greenspan’s offer because she was 
unlikely to receive offers at competing firms, due to their discriminatory hiring practices. 
It would not be an informed, rational decision for a similarly qualified male economist to 
accept a low-wage offer from Townsend-Greenspan, in light of the opportunities 
available for him at competing firms.  
In sum, the analysis of the Greenspan case has illustrated several points about 
discrimination and its effects upon labor markets. From Greenspan’s observations about 
this particular segment of the labor market, we can infer that his peer employers engaged 
in discriminatory decision-making against female workers. Discriminatory hiring was not 
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in the interest of the employers’ firms, and it created inefficiency in the labor market that 
Greenspan could use to the advantage of his own firm. The Greenspan case also 
illuminates the harms of discrimination. Employers’ discrimination had directly harmful 
effects on women’s opportunities for employment, and indirectly harmful effects on 
women’s wages. However, the paper will further argue that it is inadequate to understand 
Greenspan’s hiring policy, and the wage gap more generally, purely as a problem of 
discrimination. In the next part of the paper, I will argue that we should describe 
Greenspan’s hiring policy as exploitative.  
 
Part 3: A Conception of Exploitative Trade 
Greenspan’s story has a boastful tone as he touts the superiority of his hiring 
policy, both for his own firm and for his female employees. On the definition of 
discrimination I have provided, Greenspan’s hiring policy of targeting women for low-
paying positions is not discriminatory. Unlike his competitors’ policies, Greenspan’s 
hiring policy does not make a harmful error in judgment about women’s qualifications. 
Indeed, his attentiveness to women’s qualifications, and his strategic targeting of women 
in hiring decisions, results in more employment opportunities for female economists.
26
 
Nevertheless, his female employees still have an important moral complaint to press 
against Greenspan. This section provides a conception of exploitation that explains how 
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 Greenspan claims that his hiring policy “benefited” women, but he fails to specify his 
point of comparison. It is a weak argument that Greenspan’s policy benefited women 
because he did not discriminate against them, because failing to harm is not a benefit. A 
stronger claim is that Greenspan’s policy targeted women for low-paying positions, and 
thereby hired more women than he would have done using a “gender blind” hiring policy. 
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Greenspan wrongs his female employees: without harming them, but rather by treating 
them unfairly. 
The Reasons for the Women’s Agreement. Greenspan’s female employees 
accepted positions at his firm because it was in their interests to do so, in light of their 
limited opportunities elsewhere. As argued in the section above, accepting Greenspan’s 
low wage offer was in the women’s best interests because of the fact that they 
experienced discrimination at other firms. If the women had not suffered discrimination, 
they would have had good reason either to insist upon a higher wage from Townsend-
Greenspan (between w3-w4) or pursue opportunities elsewhere. Female economists’ 
experience of discrimination is a necessary part of the explanation of why it was rational 
for them to accept Greenspan’s low wage offer.  
Of course, women’s experience of discrimination is not the only reason they agree 
to accept Greenspan’s offer. Among other reasons, the women were willing to accept an 
offer at Townsend-Greenspan because they had an inclination to work in the profession. 
Without this inclination, the women would not have good reasons to accept Greenspan’s 
low wage over offer. For an individual with extreme distaste for the profession, however, 
even a high wage offer could be unacceptable. Our interest is in understanding why a 
person agrees to trade on unfavorable terms specifically. Discrimination is significant for 
understanding our case because it explains why a person would accept an unfavorable 
offer when she otherwise would insist upon a more favorable one.  
As an explanatory reason, discrimination is also significant because individuals 
who suffer from it are experiencing a moral wrong. I argue that exploitation occurs when 
a person experiences wrongdoing that explains why he or she accepts unfavorable terms 
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of trade (which would not be accepted otherwise). This argument joins a broader class of 
theories of exploitation that depend on a person’s experience of wrongdoing. On Hillel 
Steiner’s view, exploitation occurs when there is a violation of a person’s rights, and the 
rights-violation affects the terms of a subsequent trade.
27
 On Ruth Sample’s view, 
exploitation occurs when there is background injustice. In the context of injustice, 
economic exchanges can be exploitative in virtue of being disrespectful to one of the 
participants.
28
 If precisely the same trades were to take place within a fully just society, 
these trades could be non-exploitative in virtue of not being disrespectful. 
There is a powerful objection to the class of theories of exploitation that depend 
upon an individual’s experience of wrongdoing. The objection is that these theories fail to 
explain why an individual’s prior experience of wrongdoing should have any bearing on 
whether a trade is unfair.
29
 If we judge that a trade is non-exploitative on the basis of 
facts about its terms, the individuals’ options, and other presently observable features of 
the trade, it is arguable that the revelation of further details about one participant’s prior 
experiences ought not to affect our original judgment. Any new theory of exploitation 
within this broader class of theories must address the objection that an individual’s 
experience of wrongdoing is irrelevant.  
On my theory of exploitation, an individual’s experience of wrongdoing is 
relevant under certain conditions. It is relevant insofar as the wrongdoing is ongoing, and 
insofar as the wrongdoing explains why the exploitee agrees to accept unfavorable terms 
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 Mikhail Valdman’s suggestion that these views have a problematic feature of “history 
dependence” informs my discussion here, “Exploitation and Injustice,” Social Theory and 
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of trade. Exploitation, on my theory, can only occur when there are persons bound to act 
in fulfillment of their present duties. If an individual has suffered a wrong, such as a past 
injustice, it is not always the case that there are duty-bearers bound to act in the present. 
For my theory of exploitation to apply, a wronged individual must have an active, unmet 
claim on others to fulfill their duties to her in the present day. In addition, this unmet 
claim must have relevance for explaining the difference between the actual terms of trade 
and the counter-factual term. That is, the exploitee’s unmet claim must explain why the 
exploitee agrees to accept unfavorable terms of trade, when she otherwise would agree to 
trade on more favorable terms.  
In the next section, I will present a hypothetical case to explain the relevance of 
these conditions. I will present a case in which a person has a claim for some individuals 
in a group to act, and there is widespread non-compliance with this duty among the 
group’s members. This hypothetical case is modeled upon the situation of women who 
suffer from discrimination and who have claims for some individuals in society to act to 
end the practice. Adopting a hypothetical case allows me to explain my theory of 
exploitation, without assuming that readers have been fully convinced by the paper’s 
theory of discrimination as a practice of harmful, correlated errors in judgment. The 
paper’s theories of discrimination and exploitation are conceptually independent of one 
another, although both are necessary in order to understand the Greenspan case and the 
wage gap more generally.  
Duties and Claims of Community Membership. A small town has an understaffed 
volunteer fire department, which means that there is a high risk of avoidable fire damage 
to the part of town farthest from the fire station. At a town meeting, some community 
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members propose to raise taxes to pay for improved fire protection. The community 
members who live near the fire station successfully block these efforts and nothing else is 
done about the situation. When a major fire breaks out, many community members suffer 
damage to their homes. As the fire victims start rebuilding their homes, they buy building 
materials from their own town’s hardware store and from the hardware stores in the 
broader region. In response to the spike in demand, hardware stores in neighboring towns 
raise prices.
30
 The town’s hardware storeowner considers whether he should raise his 
prices to the same levels. He asks himself, “What prices should I charge to the members 
of my community who are rebuilding their homes?”  
One view is that he should not raise his prices for these particular customers, 
because he has a duty to restore distributional equality within his community. On this 
view, the fire victims have claims for full compensation, and the hardware store owner 
has a duty of justice to help meet their claims. If we follow this line of argument, then we 
conclude that the hardware store owner should, if anything, greatly lower his prices for 
the fire victims. This follows because the market is an important site of action for an 
individual to fulfill his duties of justice. 
But this is an invalid conclusion for two reasons. First, lowering the price of 
building materials is a mechanism of transferring resources to the victims, and resource 
transfers alone are not an adequate response to the victims’ claims. Even after the victims 
are financially compensated, there remains the underlying problem that the community 
continues to provide them with inadequate fire protection. This underlying problem can 
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 The region’s hardware storeowners might raise prices due to immediate supply 
constraints. I presume they raise prices because the present group of customers seems 
willing to pay more. 
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be addressed only through decision-making at the community level. Second, even if 
resource transfers were an adequate form of response to the victims’ claims, it is too 
quick to conclude that the hardware storeowner has a duty to make these transfers in 
virtue of his community membership. The community has a duty to the fire victims and 
this duty falls upon the community’s members. However, it does not follow from this that 
the duty falls upon the storeowner in particular. 
To answer the storeowner’s question of what he should do, it is important to 
distinguish between his duties of community membership and his duties in virtue of 
trading with the fire victims. The former are discussed here, and the latter will be 
discussed in the paper’s next sections. I propose that the storeowner’s duties as a 
community member are to make suitable contributions towards important community-
level responsibilities. He has a duty to make a contribution that is suitable to his abilities 
and talents as a community member. The kinds of actions that would fulfill his civic 
duties include volunteering with the fire department, paying taxes, and advocating for 
morally necessary reforms to town policy. To fulfill any community-level responsibility, 
some members will have to make contributions. However, it does not follow that any 
particular member has a duty to contribute to any specific community responsibility, such 
as procuring adequate fire protection for all community members or providing financial 
transfers to the fire victims. 
For my purposes in this paper, it is not essential to precisely specify the reasons 
why the storeowner has civic duties and the fire victims have corresponding claims. To 
take one possibility, the town’s founding charter could stipulate that the town’s members 
have moral and legal rights to adequate fire protection. If a fire victim has suffered a 
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violation of his rights, then he has an unmet claim for his society to do their duty in 
protecting his rights. But one instead might believe that the fire victims have unmet 
claims for beneficence or compassion from their fellow community members, rather than 
rights-claims or claims of justice. What matters here is that the fire victims have been 
wronged, and there are community members with corresponding duties to act in the 
present. The fire victims have claims for some members of the community to act on their 
duties to provide adequate fire protection and compensation for the fire damage. 
Nevertheless, the hardware storeowner does not necessarily have duties to the fire victims 
in virtue of his role as a community member. He still faces the question of how he should 
trade with the fire victims.  
The Problem of Unfair Trade. In markets, prices change because many people 
agree to trade goods and services on new terms. Due to the spike in demand from the fire 
victims rebuilding their homes, the region’s hardware stores have increased the market 
prices of home construction materials. The local hardware storeowners have made offers 
to sell home construction materials at new, higher prices, and the fire victims have agreed 
to pay them. Some other customers, who did not suffer from fire damage, might also 
agree to pay these new prices rather than put off their non-urgent building projects. This 
section will argue that the hardware storeowner’s new prices constitute exploitative trade 
with the fire victims, but they are not exploitative of his other customers who do not have 
unmet claims.  
I offer the following definition of exploitation. Exploitative trade occurs when 
Party B has an unmet claim, she exchanges goods or services with Party A on terms that 
both rationally accept, and Party B’s unmet claim influences their agreed-upon terms of 
 27 
trade. Specifically, they agree to terms of trade that are more favorable to Party A and 
less favorable to Party B than they would be in the absence of Party A’s unmet claim. To 
apply the definition to the case, we view the hardware storeowner as “Party A” and a fire 
victim as “Party B.” After the fire, the victim has a powerful desire to start rebuilding her 
home and she agrees to trade at the new, higher prices that the storeowner offers. Prior to 
the fire, the victim would agree to purchase home construction materials at lower prices 
and she would decline to pay more. In short, the victim is ordinarily a price-sensitive 
consumer of home construction materials, but due to her experience of fire damages she 
is willing to pay more. 
The fire victims are not the storeowner’s only customers, and those other 
customers also have the choice to accept or decline the new higher prices in home 
construction materials. Some of the customers are willing to pay the higher market prices, 
although they would prefer to pay less. These other customers would have continued to 
pay the lower market prices, if not for the increased demand from the fire victims. 
Nevertheless, there is a moral difference between these two groups, the fire victims and 
the other customers, despite the fact that they both accept the same higher prices.  
The fire victim’s willingness to pay higher prices is explained by her urgent desire 
to rebuild her home. Having to rebuild one’s home after damage is, understandably, a 
psychologically powerful motivation. She has a more urgent desire for home construction 
materials than she would have otherwise, and she experiences the urgency of her desire 
as a restriction upon her choices to trade. It restricts her choices because she will not 
decline to pay high prices for home construction materials, in the hope that prices 
eventually will fall to their original levels. However, it is important to note that it is only 
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the urgency of her desire that explains her willingness to pay more: the fire victim has a 
place to live, and she is not otherwise badly off. Other customers also may have urgent 
desires for home construction materials, but they simply wish to get on with their home 
renovation projects regardless of the additional costs. Their personal tendency towards 
impatience might be a vulnerability, or a defect in their agency, but it is not a constraint 
for which others are morally responsible.  
Recall that the community is morally responsible for the fire victim’s unmet 
claim, because it failed to provide adequate protection against fire damage. The fire 
victim has more restricted choices than she ought to have, due to others’ failure to do 
their duties by her. In my view, this is why her restricted choice amounts to a restriction 
upon her freedom.
31
 The difference between the fire victims and the other customs is that 
the fire victims experience their own unmet claims as a restriction upon their freedom. By 
contrast, the fire victims’ claims only have the effect of restricting the choices of the 
other customers, via the increased demand in home construction materials. These 
restrictions do not influence their freedom. 
The new market prices represent terms of trade that are more favorable to the 
hardware storeowner, and less favorable to the customers purchasing building materials. 
The hardware storeowner can charge the fire victims more than the old market prices for 
building materials and, due to their reasons for rebuilding, they will accept those new 
terms. These unfavorable terms of trade are unfair to the fire victims, and I call this an 
instance of exploitative trade. The hardware storeowner should offer the terms of a 
counterfactual trade that he and she would have agreed to, if the community had met her 
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claim. These are the terms she would have accepted if she, like many other purchasers of 
building materials, could pursue her projects without great urgency. The terms of this 
trade are the old market prices for building materials, before the fire caused avoidable 
damage to many people’s homes. 
 Non-ideal Duties and Responsibility for Trade. I have argued that the new market 
prices represent an unfair trade, and the old market prices represent a non-exploitative 
trade. The hardware storeowner’s trades with the fire victims are different from his trades 
with the other customers, even when all these trades all take place on the same terms. 
Trade with the fire victims requires special consideration, because trade with these 
individuals has the potential to be exploitative. I do not think it is wrong to trade with a 
person who merely has the potential to be exploited through trade. Rather, it is unfair to 
trade with her on terms that actually are exploitative. If the hardware storeowner were to 
engage in exploitative trade, he would enjoy greater value from its relatively favorable 
terms. This is greater value that the fire victim would have insisted upon for herself in 
their agreement to trade, were it not for a constraint she should not have experienced at 
all. Fair terms, specifically the old market prices, do not provide him with additional 
value from trade at the fire victims’ expense. 
 An important objection emerges out of an altered case, in which there is a second 
hardware storeowner who regularly charges high prices to a small group of customers. 
There is nothing special about this store or its goods, but it has a small group of 
customers who do not mind paying more. His high prices become the general market 
conditions after the fire takes place, and new customers come into his store. As with the 
first storeowner, the paper’s theory of exploitation produces the conclusion that these 
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high prices are exploitative when offered to fire victims. The fire victims are only willing 
to agree to these terms because they have unmet claims. The difficulty for the theory 
comes from the fact that trade between the second hardware storeowner and the fire 
victims would not occur in the counter-factual. In the absence of the fire, the victims 
would not pay the higher prices and the storeowner would not offer the lower prices. 
These cases illustrate a limitation of the theory of exploitation, in terms of the normative 
guidance it can offer for some cases. It can recommend avoiding exploitative trade when 
there is a clear alternative of fair trade, but by itself it does not provide definitive 
guidance when this alternative is absent.
32
  
Our first hardware storeowner might object to my argument by noting that there 
are other parties responsible for the fire victims’ unmet claims. This is an important 
observation. Some members of the community resisted efforts to adequately staff the fire 
department, because they did not want to pay for the expense. These people are most 
responsible for the fire victims’ unmet claims. The presence of other responsible parties 
indicates that, for any burdens the storeowner faces in fulfilling his duties to trade fairly, 
his burdens should be shared with others. These burdens ought to be shared between 
persons who have enabled the possibility of exploitative trade and persons who actually 
engage in exploitative trade.
33
  
I have used a simplified case to present my conception of exploitation and to 
sketch a multi-layered account of individuals’ duties and responsibilities. Often there are 
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 I cannot develop this point here, but the ideal burden-sharing arrangement depends 
upon the costs to the agents as well as the magnitude of the benefits the exploiter gains 
from unfair trade. 
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situations of widespread non-compliance with individuals’ moral duties and, in these 
circumstances, the result is that some people will have unmet claims. In these situations, 
a market actor should ensure that he fulfills his duties of fairness to his trading partners. 
He ought to offer terms of trade that approximate what his trading partners would have 
chosen—offering the value of trade they would have enjoyed—if these trading partners 
had not had an unmet claim. Putting together the findings from Part 2 and 3: Alan 
Greenspan’s unfavorable employment contracts are exploitative, and fair terms of trade 
are the terms the female workers would have accepted if they had not been wrongfully 
constrained by their experience of discrimination.  
 
Part 4: What Should Alan Greenspan Have Done?  
This paper has drawn a conceptual distinction between individuals’ duties as 
economic actors, specifically their duties of non-discrimination and non-exploitation, and 
their duties as citizens. To illustrate how these duties fit together into a coherent set of 
normative recommendations, I propose ways that Alan Greenspan could have fulfilled his 
civic duties and his duties as an economic actor. To conclude the section, I will also 
defend my argument against two objections concerning the extent and grounding of 
Greenspan’s duties to his female employees. These objections are 1) that merely 
extending opportunities to women is enough; and 2) that unequal pay is discriminatory 
and/or an injustice. 
Greenspan’s Duties and Responsibilities. First, I consider Greenspan’s civic 
duties. Following from my definition of discrimination, Greenspan did not discriminate 
against female workers, because he did not make errors that were correlated with the 
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errors of his peers. Indeed, Greenspan understood very well the errors in his peers’ 
decision-making, and took care to avoid making them himself. However, this does not 
exhaust the scope of his duties with respect to the practice of discrimination within his 
society.  
I believe that Greenspan also had positive duties as a citizen to help redress 
manifest injustices in his society, particularly to help redress the set of injustices that are 
perpetuated by his peers and that cannot be fully addressed by state regulation. Female 
workers’ primary claims for non-discriminatory treatment are addressed to employers 
who discriminate against them, and Greenspan did not fall into this category. However, 
female employees also have secondary claims for assistance from citizens who are well-
situated to help dismantle the practice. As a leader in the business community in the 
1970s, Greenspan could have undertaken various attempts to make its beliefs and socially 
accepted patterns of behavior less prejudicial to women. He could have attempted to 
convince competing firms that their hiring practices were manifestly unjust. He could 
have pointed out that their hiring practices seemed to be economically inefficient, noting 
his own success in hiring highly qualified female workers. He could have publicly 
affirmed the qualifications of his female workers, setting them up as role models for the 
next generation of female economists. These are just a few possibilities. 
It is not necessarily the case that Greenspan was obligated to direct his civic 
efforts towards gender discrimination, since the civic duty to undermine manifest 
injustice can be fulfilled in many different ways. Greenspan was similarly well situated to 
redress racial prejudice, class bias, and unaccommodating treatment of the disabled 
within his profession. There is no reason to believe that women should have taken 
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priority over these other groups, who also suffer from manifest injustices in their society. 
If we view Greenspan’s civic duties as limited, as I believe we must, then we could not 
fault him for choosing to meet other citizens’ claims.  
 Consider if Greenspan had used his status in the business community to convince 
his colleagues to make greater accommodations for disabled employees. When 
confronted by a disabled person who still suffered from lack of accommodation within 
the business community, Greenspan would have had a compelling justification for not 
doing more to help: “It may be true that you continue to suffer from a manifest injustice, 
but I myself have performed my own limited duty as a citizen. Your complaint is with 
citizens who have been derelict in fulfilling their duties.” Greenspan could have offered 
the same justification to other citizens, such as to women within the profession who 
suffered from discrimination: “It may be true that you suffer from discrimination, but I 
have already done my own civic duty.” It is possible that Greenspan in fact made these 
contributions or similar contributions, although these efforts to redress manifest injustice 
were not reported in his memoirs. Presuming that Greenspan did not fulfill his civic duty 
in any of these possible ways, he has significant remedial responsibilities to compensate 
for his long-standing dereliction.  
Second, Greenspan had duties that were specific to his role as an economic actor. 
As I argued in Part 2, Greenspan was engaged in trade on terms that were relatively 
favorable to him. His female employees had reasons to accept these relatively 
unfavorable terms, due to their experience of gender discrimination. Applying the 
conclusions from Part 3, we can see that Greenspan’s trade with his female employees 
took place on exploitative terms, rather than the fair terms the women would have 
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accepted if not for their unmet claims. What should Greenspan have done? Greenspan 
should have negotiated his female employees’ employment contracts on more favorable 
terms, including higher wages and other benefits as well. Specifically, he should have 
provided his female employees with terms of employment that they would have chosen in 
a counter-factual market. In this counterfactual, women would not have suffered repeated 
exclusion from economic opportunities, and the market price of their labor would be 
higher. The prices in this counterfactual market are the fair price of the female 
economists’ labor.  
There are circumstances in which it is not economically feasible for an individual 
or business to pay above-market prices, such as in a market with intense competition on 
prices. In these kinds of circumstances constraining individuals’ feasible choices, we can 
describe the duty to trade fairly with a disjunctive proposition. An individual can either 
trade on terms that are fair or he can trade unfairly and provide redress for his 
unavoidable wrongdoing. Redress might involve financial compensation at a later date, 
when it is more feasible for the individual to provide it. It might also involve non-
financial contributions to try to lessen the burden on the exploited party, or public 
advocacy for others to help satisfy her unmet claim.  
Greenspan’s memoirs report that his firm was profitable, and so it seems feasible 
he could have paid his female employees higher wages. Since he did not pay fair wages, 
Greenspan had responsibilities to redress his unfair treatment of his employees. This duty 
of redress is owed particularly to the female employees he treated unfairly. He could 
have provided a lump sum payment to his former employees, as compensation for their 
unfair wages throughout their employment at Townsend-Greenspan. If this were 
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infeasible, redress could have taken different forms. For instance, he could have 
personally mentored his female employees and instituted programs at his firm to provide 
support for their career advancement. 
Objection 1: Merely Extending Opportunities to Women is Enough. One objection 
to my argument is that Alan Greenspan already did enough for women, through the 
pursuit of his own self-interest and through his superior understanding of the dynamics of 
the labor market. If Greenspan had attempted to “trade fairly,” by paying more to each 
female employees, he would have hired fewer female employees and thereby achieved 
less good for women overall.  
This objection puts a great deal of faith in the power of markets and savvy 
businesspeople to solve problems like discrimination in labor markets. In a perfectly 
competitive market, it would not be possible for employers to participate in a practice of 
discrimination against women, because the high costs of their correlated errors would 
drive their businesses out of the market. However, imperfect competition is the norm 
rather than the exception within labor markets, and imperfectly competitive markets 
permit much greater differentiation amongst economic actors in their decision-making, as 
well as much greater scope for correlated errors. Greenspan’s actions should be evaluated 
in the context of others’ non-compliance with their own duties as economic actors. In this 
context, there are dual dangers of participation in a practice of discrimination and of 
engagement in exploitative trade. 
The objection could be pressed that Greenspan’s hiring policy extended economic 
opportunities to women who otherwise might have had none. His policy had a beneficial 
effect for these women, and it might have contributed to broader social changes over 
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time. However, it does not follow from this that Greenspan fulfilled his duties as a citizen 
or his duties of fairness as a market actor. Greenspan should have done more to fulfill his 
civic duty to undermine manifest injustices in his society, such as addressing the biases of 
his peers. As for Greenspan’s duties as a market actor, Townsend-Greenspan appears to 
have had a sufficient profit margin to pay its female employees a higher wage, without 
reducing its staff (this is possible because the market is not perfectly competitive). While 
Greenspan may have had sufficient profit margins to trade fairly, it is not always feasible 
for an economic actor to fulfill his duties of fairness in trade, without suffering other 
losses. In these cases, we can view a market actor’s duties as disjunctive: to trade fairly or 
to trade unfairly, while providing redress at the earliest opportunity. 
Objection 2: Unequal Pay is Discriminatory and/or an Injustice. An alternative 
interpretation of Alan Greenspan’s hiring policy is much more critical of his behavior. 
According to the standard of “equal pay for equal work,” an employer who offers women 
unequal pay for equal work is engaged in a discriminatory act and/or an unjust act. Thus, 
Greenspan himself engaged in discrimination, because he paid men and women unequal 
amounts for the same work.  
This paper does not offer a complete theory of discrimination, which would have 
scope over all possible cases. Rather, it takes the view that the term “discrimination” can 
have several meanings. Given plural meanings of the term “discrimination,” however, the 
statement that Greenspan engaged in discrimination could be misleading. If Alan 
Greenspan discriminates against women, and his competitors also discriminate against 
women, the term “discrimination” fails to convey important differences in how they have 
acted. The same problem arises with the statement that Alan Greenspan has committed an 
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“injustice,” because this fails to convey that Greenspan’s unjust act is different from his 
competitors’ actions.  
The paper has not provided a ranking of the moral wrongness of discrimination 
(as it understands the term), and other problematic acts undertaken by employers. 
However, it has illustrated an empirical relationship between Greenspan’s success in 
offering a low wage to his female employees and his competitors’ discriminatory hiring 
practices. As the paper has argued, Greenspan could not have successfully offered low 
wages to the female economists if they had not experienced a restriction of their 
opportunities elsewhere. His competitors’ harmful, erroneous judgments, therefore, 
enabled Greenspan to discriminate according to the “unequal pay for equal work” 
standard. In sum, his competitors’ form of discrimination is the root of other wrongs, 
including exploitation and the violation of the “equal pay for equal work” standard. I 
suggest that discrimination as a practice of harmful, mistaken judgments is a particularly 
bad form of discrimination, due to this empirical relationship, and it ought to be noted as 
such in our language. 
 
Conclusion  
 This paper has described two important duties of economic actors: duties of non-
discrimination and duties of non-exploitation. To fulfill both kinds of duties, an economic 
actor needs to take account of how his peers make decisions. It is acceptable for an 
economic actor to make random errors in the pursuit of his own interests, but he should 
make sure that his errors are not correlated with the errors of his peers. Economic actors 
should not participate in a practice of discrimination that harms individuals by repeatedly 
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denying them opportunities to engage in mutually beneficial exchange. When a practice 
of discrimination exists, it creates opportunities for exploitative trade with persons who 
suffer the harmful effects of discrimination. Insofar as this form of discrimination 
restricts opportunities without directly affecting talents and skills, it is an important and 
likely route for exploitation to take hold within the labor market. 
My analysis of the Greenspan case illustrates some of the practical difficulties 
associated with normative recommendations for individuals acting in non-ideal 
circumstances. Gender discrimination is a socially complex phenomenon that is difficult 
to understand at an empirical level. Individuals can unknowingly perpetuate women’s 
repeated experience of economic exclusion, if they lack knowledge of other actors’ 
decision-making processes. It is also difficult for an individual to recognize the diffuse 
effects of lingering social problems, such as gender discrimination, on his own economic 
choices. Finally, this paper has not resolved the question of the comparative significance 
of individuals’ duties as economic actors and as civic actors, for closing the wage gap. 
However, this question will have to await resolution of empirical disagreements 
regarding the comparative significance of the wage gap’s multiple causes.34  
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